As a consequence of liberalization policies in the European Union (EU), a number of formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and electricity successfully transformed themselves into some of the world's leading Multinationals. The precise relationship between liberalization and incumbent internationalization, however, is contested. This article tests three persuasive arguments derived from the political economy literature on this relationship. The first claims that incumbents most exposed to domestic liberalization would internationalise most. The second asserts the opposite: incumbents operating where liberalization was restricted could exploit monopolistic rents to finance their aggressive internationalisation. The third argument claims that a diversity of paths will be adopted by countries and incumbents vis-à-vis liberalization and internationalization. Using correlation and cluster analysis of the whole sample of EU telecoms and electricity incumbent Multinationals, evidence is found in favour of the third hypothesis. Internationalization as a response to liberalization took diverse forms in terms of timing and extent and this is best explained using a country, sector and firm logic.
INTRODUCTION
It was only from the 1980s that the European Commission (EC) started to embark seriously on forging market integration in the network industries, particularly in telecommunications and electricity, despite the fact it had enjoyed significant legal competence in the field since the Treaty of Rome. 1 The new, liberalized policy environment which gradually extended over these two sectors substantially changed the business options available to incumbents. In particular, liberalization 'enabled' these previously inward-looking domestic incumbents to contemplate, and pursue, expansion abroad. As a consequence of the new policy environment, dozens of incumbentspreviously perceived by some politicians as inefficient 'lame ducks' fit only for privatization during the new economic policy emerging from the 1980s (Crafts 1991 ) -rapidly transformed into highly respected, world class Multinational Corporations. Their emergence perhaps provided evidence at last of a new dawn of European 'international champions', this time not in the traditional industrial sectors (Hayward 1995) , but in the network industries since, though business reached many corners of the globe, the overwhelming bulk of investment was in other EU countries (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2007) . The policies which underlined their emergence could be understood as a response to a concern that European business, including network industries, had to adapt to new technological and competitive challenges from the United States, Japan and beyond. Market integration in the network industries, it was anticipated, would 1 
Services of General Economic Interest figured in the Treaty of Rome as exceptions to
competition policy where this threatened general interest provision. See Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes (2005) .
result in a smaller number of more competitive firms better able to confront global challenges. From the 1990s, a significant number of these incumbents internationalized and now figure not only as some of Europe's but also the world's largest Multinationals.
EDF, Telefónica, E.ON, Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom and RWE ranked in the world's top 25 non-financial Multinationals in 2006 (UNCTAD 2008 . Fifteen years earlier, none of these firms figured in the top 100 ranking. Given this development, it would appear that European policy-makers met with some success. Now, liberalization was a 'prerequisite' of incumbent internationalization, because it reduced or removed previous restrictions on investment and ownership across borders.
Internationalization would not have been prioritised or even permitted when nationalized incumbents were domestic monopoly public service suppliers. However, the precise relationship between incumbents' internationalization and liberalization is highly contested. Considerable tension has been generated around the perception that some incumbents embark on aggressive internationalization strategies in other countries which are relatively more exposed to liberalization -even daring to take over 'their' national 'jewel in the crown' -whilst the 'aggressors'' home governments delay or restrict liberalization in that sector. While this perception could generate disquiet in any industry, it is particularly alive in energy and communications, which have long been considered of national strategic, economic and social importance. Indeed, far from their strategic role becoming obsolete in the twenty-first century, new modes of terrorism have used network industries to organise (communications) and deliver (transportation and postal services) terror. For market integration to be successful, it is essential that a level-playing field is created and that it is perceived that all players stick to the rules of the game. To this end, common liberalization deadlines are set, and the EC uses various disciplinary instruments to 'punish' non-compliers. The problem of 'asymmetric behaviour' has been partially addressed in the drafting of the new electricity directive (EC 2009 ) through the so-called ´Gazprom clause' which stipulates prospective acquisitions by vertically integrated firms can be blocked if the target incumbent has unbundled. In practice, liberalization as a process is rarely implemented identically in different settings: the way that policy is understood, and the speed and depth of its implementation, invariably differ. Political economists ascribe the different ways in which a policy such as liberalization is implemented on the ground to the various and multiple pressures States receive from businesses, trade unions, NGOs, as well as the extent to which the State can respond (Smith 2001; Thatcher 2001; Henisz and Zelner 2006) . Purposeful delay -or the perception of purposeful delay -could bring market integration to a stand-still ('why should we open up, with all the political headaches it involves, if they aren't?'). 2 Thus, the question of States' and firms' responses to liberalization cuts to the heart of the political economy of the integration process.
There are several persuasive arguments in the political economy literature on the relationship between internationalization and liberalization. Three main approaches will be tested here. The first argument underlines the logic of EC policy in this field: sectoral liberalization leads to the erosion of the incumbents' market share, exposing managers to the 'cold winds' of international competition. Building on a body of scholarship on telecommunications and electricity reform (Börsch 2004 , Eising 2002 , Haar and Jones 2008 , Héritier 2002 , Murillo 2009 , Thatcher 2001 , Van Kranenburg and Hagedoorn 2008 this article analyses the role of liberalization policy in explaining incumbent internationalization outcomes in telecommunications and electricity in the EU. Correlation and cluster analysis methodology is deployed to analyse all major telecoms (12) and electricity (17) Multinationals in the EU plus Norway. 3 Analysis of these two sectors is justified because: of their role in economic growth; they provide critical networks for the movement of knowledge and energy required by the Single Market; they still constitute 3 Single market rules apply to Norway as a member of the European Economic Area.
See Bartle (2006) . The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents the three main arguments on the relationship between incumbent internationalization and liberalization and derives hypotheses for competitive testing. The third section operationalizes the hypotheses and synthesizes the research design. The fourth section provides data on the major EU telecoms and electricity incumbents including internationalization. The fifth part contains the analysis divided into two sub-sections, telecommunications and electricity. Conclusions follow.
THREE HYPOTHESES ON THE ROLE OF LIBERALIZATION ON INCUMBENT INTERNATIONALIZATION
There is a vast literature in the social sciences on why firms internationalize. It is a daunting task to summarise this literature; here, three main points will be made about the state-of-the-art literature in order to contextualise the more specific political economy literature which deals with the role of policy on internationalization. It is first important to remember that most research on why firms went abroad focused on the manufacturing, oil and financial sectors, reflecting the profile of most twentieth-century Multinationals. Logically, much less attention has been paid to why firms in network industries go abroad, so their recent internationalization is presenting new research challenges (UNCTAD 2008 , Jakopin 2008 . Secondly, the reasons why a firm goes abroad are complex and interwoven, and cannot usually be reduced to a single factor.
Theories or paradigms developed to explain firm internationalization take in multiple variables. Despite differences across schools of thought on international business, one particularly influential perspective was developed by John Dunning (1989) . Briefly, the 'OLI' paradigm locates reasons for internationalization in 'O' (firm-specific advantages), 'L' (country specific advantages) and 'I' (internalization). Thirdly, scholars are increasingly recognising the role of policy and other institutional factors as variables in the internationalization decision, after having been rather neglected (Dunning 2009; Spar 2001 the greater a firm is exposed to earlier and deeper liberalization, the more that firm will respond to increased pressure on its domestic market by increasingly going abroad in search of markets.
Another reading from political economy predicts a different outcome from which the second hypothesis is derived (Bonardi 2004; Chari and Gupta 2008 , Haar and Jones 2008 , Sarkar et al. 1999 The third hypothesis is influenced by the comparative political economy and institutionalist literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) which focuses on reform in these sectors (Börsch 2004 , Levi-Faur 2006 , Murillo 2009 , Thatcher and Héritier 2002 . The most nuanced of these accounts is Thatcher (2007) . This adopts a policy analysis approach and argues different paths to reform, explained by institutional differences, may eventually lead to relatively similar outcomes. In common with the other two perspectives, it is assumed that liberalization is important and firms and States act rationally. Institutional and geopolitical differences, however, matter, and significantly shape processes and outcomes, hence countries and sectors may embark on different paths towards a similar reform direction. So, hypothesis 3 claims that governments and firms responded in various rational ways to liberalization, incumbent internationalization being one of those responses, and these differences of timing and 5 Times 18 April 2007 extent can be explained by institutional differences even if some convergence is finally attained.
Testing these three hypotheses is the central aim of this article. However, there are two secondary questions that require brief attention: ownership and firm size. Liberalization has often been confused with privatization. These two policies are conceptually quite different, since liberalization entails introducing competition, whilst privatization means more private ownership. Whilst the EC has competence in liberalization policy, it is up to national governments to implement privatization (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2006) . Did privatization influence internationalization? It could be argued that more privatization makes a company more visible to its stock-holders, forcing it to be efficient and maximise profits, whilst cutting its political ties make the firm more agile to move (Megginson and Netter 2001) . Thus, the greater a firm is privatised, the more likely that firm is to respond to increased pressure on its domestic market by seeking out more profitable markets abroad (hypothesis 4). In many ways, hypothesis 4 is the corollary of hypothesis 1, in that greater liberalization and deeper privatization form part of the reform of the network industries so are seen as going hand in hand. The opposite of this argument is the corollary to hypothesis 2. Mergers and Acquisitions are often once-off, risky and politically complex operations: board-room politics often becomes transformed into 'high politics' when potential gains are significant.
Incumbents with significant political involvement may be at an advantage in that they could have access to more information as well as to politicians who could 'smooth the way' for the operation to take place. Following this logic, firms with significant public ownership may be more likely to internationalize more strongly, thanks to interference from a political 'visible' hand. Thus, less privatization should be correlated to more internationalization (hypothesis 5). Finally, firm size could be an important factor enabling firm internationalization. For instance, there may be a minimum size that firms need to reach before internationalization becomes possible. Hence, firm size is a control variable throughout the analysis.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Four hypotheses predict a lineal and continuous relationship between internationalization and liberalization policy (1 and 2), and internationalization and privatization (4 and 5), albeit in different directions. If hypothesis 1 is correct, we would expect to find correlations between higher levels of firm internationalization with deeper and faster implementation of liberalization, in its multiple forms. Hypothesis 2 is correct if restricted and more sluggish liberalization implementation was correlated with greater incumbent internationalization. As regards internationalization and ownership, hypothesis 4 predicts that more privatization will be correlated with greater internationalization, and hypothesis 5, less privatization would be correlated with greater internationalization. Incumbent size is controlled for throughout. Correlational analysis measures the strength of the associations between the independent and dependent variables, thus is appropriate to test these hypotheses. Hypothesis 3, in contrast, predicts that there is no fixed relationship between the variables; rather, there will be multiple paths in terms of the timing and extent towards incumbent internationalization and liberalization, which can be explained by institutional differences. Cluster analysis is ideal for testing this, since patterns of incumbent behaviour are made visible.
A 'SNAPSHOT' OF RECENT INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EU TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY INCUMBENTS
Before proceeding to competitively test the hypotheses on the relationship between incumbent internationalization and liberalization, a sketch of the internationalization of major EU telecoms and electricity incumbents is provided. Tables 1 and 2 or the extent to which the industry has been unbundled, 1 meaning the industry is integrated, 0 meaning it is fully unbundled (Conway and Nicoletti 2006) . Indicators for ownership are also included: 0 means full public ownership; 1 means total private ownership. 
ANALYSIS
The five hypotheses are now tested using correlation and cluster analysis techniques.
Results are divided into telecoms and electricity.
Telecoms
Correlation between variables using Pearson bivariate correlation, Kendall rank and Spearman rank correlation were used to detect the strength of association between internationalization and entry regulation, market structure, ownership, size (revenue and Finally, BT alone forms cluster 3, as incumbent internationalization was relatively low and where market structure had been highly liberalization. BT's lower international level was due to the fact that much of its initial international activity was sold off after its abandonment during firm re-organization.
Electricity
Using the same correlation techniques and periods of time as for telecoms, the extent of aggressive internationalization in the context of low entry regulation liberalization. As in telecoms, the leader incumbent internationalizers emerged from contexts where liberalization is both less and more advanced. E.ON could be compared to Telefónica in its pursuit of ambitious internationalization from a relatively closed market. Most incumbents pursued relatively cautious internationalization programmes in 1999. There were two similarly-sized clusters of incumbents here: cluster 3 where liberalization was more advanced, and cluster 1 where this was delayed. Included in cluster 3 were Spanish regional incumbents (Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa) and in cluster 1 were
German regional incumbents (RWE and EnBW). These Spanish and German incumbents had much lower internationalization levels than Endesa and E.ON
respectively. This suggests that even a national-sectoral approach cannot account for the variety of firm strategies adopted. Rather, varieties of response are located at the firm level. Finally, most incumbents pursued internationalization slowly; only five of seventeen incumbents were pursuing internationalization with great enthusiasm in 1999.
Attention is now turned to the other liberalization indicator, vertical integration, shown on the right-hand side of Table 4 . Cluster 1 comprises incumbents which made overthe-average progress unbundling and where internationalization was stronger: Fortum, Endesa, E.ON and RWE. 9 As mentioned previously and in common with telecoms, the vast majority of electricity incumbents were slow to internationalise in 1999. In both 9 In the 1999 cluster analysis of internationalization and entry regulation RWE was included in the cluster of lower internationalized and lower liberalized firms: however, in the cluster showing internationalization and vertical integration, it falls into the group of more highly internationalised firms based in countries which are slower to unbundle. telecoms and electricity, only a minority of incumbents were already strongly internationalised by 1999. Of the lesser internationalised incumbents, three fell into cluster 2, where unbundling is progressing slowly; the bulk (eight) fall into cluster 3, where unbundling is being pursued.
How did these incumbents evolve over the next seven years? Analysis is first turned to internationalization and entry regulation. By 2006, there is some convergence in the sense that all incumbents bar one, Electrabel, which is discussed below, are in either As regards internationalization and vertical integration, the most internationalized of electricity incumbents are divided up nearly equally into two clusters, since, whilst entry regulation liberalization was nearly complete in 2006, progress on unbundling was mixed. First, there was a group of seven highly internationalised incumbents based in countries where unbundling was more advanced (cluster 4). This included National
Grid, Scottish Power, Endesa, Unión Fenosa, Dong Energy and EVN. These incumbents were able to internationalise as both entry regulation and unbundling were implemented. Second, a group of six incumbents (cluster 1) pursued significant internationalisation expansion, in a context of liberalised entry but delayed unbundling (E.ON, EDF, RWE, Vattenfall, EDP, and Fortum). The main exception was Electrabel, which had delayed both forms of liberalization, as previously explained. So, Finland's Fortum, which in 1999 seemed to be setting the pace for internationalization in the context of advanced liberalization, and saw its foreign revenues increase over seven years from 32% 73%, did so whilst unbundling remained stagnant. A similar observation can be made of the other cluster members. A third cluster, 3, comprises three incumbents whose internationalization was somewhat slower in a context of greater progress unbundling. EnBW is alone in cluster 2, enjoying higher vertical integration but less internationalization. Here, it can be seen how Iberdrola and EnBW, operating in the same policy environment as their other highly internationalized Spanish and German peers, were both much slower to internationalise. Again, diversity is beyond national and sectoral patterns, it is ultimately located at the firm level.
CONCLUSIONS: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS IN TELECOMS AND ELECTRICITY
Regulatory reforms defined broadly as liberalization were a prerequisite for the rise of telecoms and energy Multinationals. Notes: N=12. * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed) . ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed).
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. Notes: N=12, * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed) . ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed) . a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
